



Developing an Integrative Semiotic Framework for 
Information Systems: The Social, Personal and Material 
Worlds 
John Mingers 




Department of Information Systems, LSE, Houghton Street London 
l.p.willcocks@lse.ac.uk 
 
Abstract The paper argues that semiotics, the theory of signs and symbols, is at the heart of the 
representation and transmission of information and meaning, and is thus central, to communication 
and information systems, but especially in their contemporary, more virtualized forms. The paper is 
distinctive in eschewing post-structuralist uses of Saussurian semiotics, and recent theorizations of 
sociomateriality, instead developing an integrative framework grounded in Habermasian concepts, 
Peirceian semiotics and an underlying, integrating critical realist philosophy. We develop a semiotic 
framework to help analyze the complex interactions between three different worlds – the personal, the 
social and the material. Here semiosis relates to the personal world through the generation and 
interpretation of signs and messages. It relates to the material world in that all signs must have some 
form of physical embodiment in order to be signs, and must also be transmitted through some form of 
physical media. Semiosis relates to the social world in that the connotive aspects of sign systems are 
social rather than individual – they exist before and beyond the individual’s use of signs. The 
personal, social and material worlds between them bear relationships of sociation, sociomateriality 
and embodiment. The framework draws on fundamental concepts of information, meaning and 
embodied cognition. The paper examines critically the implications of this formulation for studying 
information systems. It discusses commonalities with and departures from other studies, illustrates 
points with empirical examples, and details how the integrative framework can be utilized.  
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The two most distinctive characteristics that distinguish human beings from other animals are 
their advanced ability to use language to co-ordinate their actions (Goldkuhl & Lyytinen, 
1982; Hirschheim, Klein, & Lyytinen, 1996; K. Lyytinen, 1985; Maturana, 1978; Mead, 
1934) and the ability to develop and use tools to shape their environment (Habermas, 1978).  
Language and communication are based fundamentally on meaning and signification which 
is essentially cognitive, while tools and technology are primarily realized in a physical form. 
Information systems, or more generally information and communication technology (ICT), 
cut across this divide in that they concern language and signification embodied and 
transmitted through technology. This is nothing new but undoubtedly, with mobile 
technologies and social networking, it is more so than ever before.  
 
We can see, therefore, that ICT inevitably involves an inter-twining of two worlds – the 
social and the technical – and this relationship has been extensively debated. We can 
distinguish three primary positions regarding this relationship. First, are those who emphasize 
the dominance of one system over the other. Within this category are the technological 
“determinists” such as Woodward (1958) and Perrow (1970) who argue that the nature of the 
technology imposes major constraints on individuals and organizations. More recent work is 
highly varied in scope and level but generally treats technology as an independent variable 
within the research (W.  Orlikowski & Scott, 2008, p. 439-446). Perhaps in reaction to this 
view, there developed a focus on the social aspects of technology – the ways in which people 
organized around or shaped technology (Howcroft, Mitev, & Wilson, 2004) – which includes 
the social shaping of technology (SST) and the social construction of technology (SCOT) 
(Pinch & Bijker, 1984) perspectives. These could be seen as social “determinists”.  
 
Second, there are those who conceptualize two ontologically distinct systems that interact and 
mutually influence each other (W.  Orlikowski & Scott, 2008, p. 446-454). Examples are the 
original socio-technical studies of Trist and colleagues (Trist & Murray, 1993), Zuboff’s 
(1988) study of the process of informating, and Zammuto et al’s (2007) work drawing on 
Gibson’s theory of ecological perception and affordances. Third, and most recent, we find 
theorists who argue that the two systems are so inextricably inter-twined that they cannot in 




object-centered sociality (Knorr-Cetina, 1997), agential realism (Barad, 2003) and relational 
materiality (Law, 2004). Within IS, this position has been called “sociomateriality” to 
emphasize the inseparability of the social and the material (Leonardi & Barley, 2008; W. 
Orlikowski, 2000, 2007; W.  Orlikowski & Scott, 2008) and is, in part, the subject of this 
paper. 
 
Sociomateriality, taken in a strong form, has profound implications for it argues that the 
social and the material are so deeply inter-related and mutually constituting that it is not in 
fact possible, even analytically, to separate them. We follow Mutch (2013) in arguing against 
that position and instead maintain the critical realist view that they are actually two, 
ontologically independent but interacting structures. Mutch’s paper concerns the work of 
Barad (2003), who is a philosopher of natural science, whose work has been drawn on 
Orlikowski et al. as an underpinning for sociomateriality. Barad is mainly considering 
quantum physics but generalizes her ideas to encompass social systems as well. Barad’s 
primary contention is that we cannot consider that there is some independent object world 
(for her at a quantum level) and then separately an observer who conceptualizes it. Rather, 
she maintains what she calls agential realism. She argues that there are real phenomena but 
that they only come about in the entangled interaction of a multiplicity of elements, including 
the observer and their observing apparatuses, and that this happens in such a way that it is 
impossible to separate out the two. Any partial resolution of this indeterminacy is brought 
about by what she calls an “agential cut” which “enacts a local resolution within the 
phenomenon of the inherent ontological indeterminacy” (Barad, 2003, p 815). 
 
Mutch raises a number of criticisms of Barad’s work, and hence of sociomateriality more 
generally. In brief: i) that her interpretation of quantum theory is itself contentious (Norris, 
2000) and her generalization of this to non-physical realms such as the social world even 
more so; ii) that the focus on the actuality of practice loses the temporal dimension of 
analysis, ignoring the fact that social structures already pre-exist those acting at a particular 
point in time; iii) that empirical studies have found it difficult to actually operationalize this 
approach, particularly (and ironically) finding it hard to conceptualize the material aspects of 




accounts of participants and so does not recognize the unacknowledged conditions of action, 
and unintended consequences of a world that is not necessarily transparent to social actors. 
 
Leonardi (2013), in a generally sympathetic response to Mutch, argues that there should not 
be an either/or between critical realism and agential realism as underpinning philosophies for 
sociomateriality but that they rather should be seen as alternatives that could be used in 
different contexts. However, this assumes that sociomateriality is somehow separable from its 
philosophical underpinnings and justifiable in its own right, and that it is compatible with the 
presuppositions of critical realism, contentions which we do not accept. We observe 
additional limitations of recent representations of sociomateriality. First, that ICT also 
involves a third world, as well as the social and material, which is the individual or personal 
(Habermas, 1984, 1987). Ultimately, communications and information systems rest on 
individuals who create and send, or have sent, messages and data; then receive and interpret 
them; then act (or not act) upon them. Habermas (1990), in developing his theory of 
communicative action and discourse ethics (Mingers & Walsham, 2010), emphasized the 
ontological and epistemological differences between three worlds all of which are necessary 
to understand the nature of human communication. Second, there is the fundamental problem 
of representation. Information systems do not simply store and transmit pure information, but 
rather representations of that information, and the form of the representation itself 
significantly affects the meaning that the information may generate – what we can call the 
semiotics of information. The performative effects of representation in itself has been 
explored by Cooper (1992, 1993), Lilley et al (2004), Dulipovici and Robey (2013), and 
Kallinikos (1993), and we explore these dimensions in this paper. 
 
The paper begins by signaling the need to develop a richer way of using semiotics in the 
study of  information systems. In the next five sections we build, out of a fundamentally 
Peirceian semiotics, our theoretical integrative framework. We begin with philosophical 
underpinnings drawn from Habermas and critical realism as these are broad enough to 
encompass a variety of different domains – material, social and personal -  and also have 
links to both Peirce’s work generally and semiotics in particular. We then move to a detailed 
discussion of Peirceian semiotics as the key to our framework. There follows a semiotic 




to meaning. From this we consider the manner in which people both produce and interpret 
communications as a process of embodied cognition. Our development process results in an 
integrative framework that locates semiosis as the founding set of operations at the centre of 
three worlds – the personal, social and material. In the final sections we illustrate use of the 
integrative framework in information systems studies with two empirical examples and 
conclude by returning to the discussion of sociomateriality.  
 
2. From Sociomateriality to Semiotics  
Orlikowski (2010) provides a powerful example of the issues this paper deals with,  and the 
relevance of the  integrative framework we will develop. She describes MPK20, and the Sun 
Microsystems Project Wonderland rooms, offices, screens and documents that form part of an 
online, three dimensional, immersive environment for workplace collaboration. While she 
does not develop the analysis of this synthetic world, she asks interesting questions of how 
they can be researched. She chooses the perspective of entanglement and draws upon actor 
network theory and Barad’s (2003) notion of “apparatus” to focus the research possibilities. 
However,  given the centrality of humans and of meaning and communication in how 
MPK20 and the Project Wonderland Rooms operate, the sociomateriality perspective as 
described lacks a coherent semiotic dimension  in  understanding  the material, social and 
personal worlds being described and analyzed. How does meaning arise? What sign systems 
are operating and how are they employed? What are the power dimensions of the control or 
lack of influence over meaning, communication, and information? How do social structures 
and processes relate to personal understandings and influence action? What is the role of non-
material technological objects in the generation of meaning, behavior and performance? 
These are only illustrative additional research questions that follow from using the integrative 
summary framework we will develop, but do not flow easily from applying a more limited 
‘sociomateriality’ perspective.  
 
Our foregoing arguments suggest that communication and technology needs to be more 
precisely located within a broader integrative framework that makes more explicit a family of 
concepts and their relationships needed to study advanced information and communications 
technologies in contemporary organizations. In order to accomplish this, we have found it 




material - from which we can address their inter-connections. Communication is underpinned 
by systems of meaning and signification, and the discipline that most thoroughly deals with 
signification in general is semiotics or semiology – the science of signs and sign production 
and transmission. A sign is an event, an object, a symbol or a behavior that represents 
something other than itself. Signs depend upon a shared set of meanings within a particular 
community and are the basis of all communication, whether linguistic or not. Semiotics 
studies the processes that lead signs to have particular meanings, and the ways in which such 
meanings are communicated and have effects. In many ways, semiotics can be seen as the 
most fundamental of the social sciences since it underlies all communication and social 
action. Moreover, by its nature, semiotics has to consider both individuals, as senders and 
receivers, and technology as the medium in which signs are embodied and transmitted, and 
thus relates to all three worlds. 
 
In recent history, semiotics
1
 has two significantly different lines of development, one 
traceable to Ferdinand de Saussure (1960 (originally 1916)), a Swiss linguist, and the other to 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1931-1958), an American philosopher and scientist. Both lines lead 
to very modern philosophers/sociologists – for example, Derrida and Giddens on the one 
hand, and Habermas on the other. In this paper we shall primarily be drawing on Peirce’s 
approach. We do so because Saussure only considered signifier (the sign) and signified 
(meaning) leaving out the world of the referent – a critical omission and a strong reason for 
preferring Pierce’s approach, and eschewing Saussurian-based post-structuralist uses of 
semiotics. Moreover, as we shall see, Habermasian and critical realist thinking are informed 




                                               
1 Good  source material includes (Chandler, 2002; Krampen, Oehler, Posner, Sebeok, & von Uexkull, 1987; 
Martin & Ringham, 2006; Noth, 1990) 
2
 Thus Bhaskar (1993) explicitly acknowledges the centrality of the semiotic triangle to any adequate theory of 
meaning. Following Peirce, Morris (1938) characterized semiotics in terms of three dimensions: syntactic which 
studies the relations between signs and other signs; semantics which studies the relations between signs and 
their objects; and pragmatics which studies the uses of signs by their interpreters. This trichotomy formed the 






3. Philosophical Underpinnings:  Habermas and Critical Realism 
3.1 Habermas and the Three Worlds 
Habermasian critical social theory (CST) has a long, if somewhat marginal, history within IS. 
Perhaps the first to draw attention to the potential of critical theory within management and 
IS was Mingers (1980) who contrasted it with soft systems methodology (SSM) (Checkland 
& Holwell, 1998). It was later proposed as a foundational philosophy for IS research, in 
contrast to positivism or interpretivism by Lyytinen and Klein (1985), Klein and Lyytinen 
(1985) and Hirschheim and Klein (1989). This led on to the development of CST-based 
research methodologies (Cecez-Kecmanovic, 2001; Hirschheim & Klein, 1994; Laughlin, 
1987; K. Lyytinen, 1992). More recently, Mingers and Walsham (2010) and Ross and 
Chiasson (2011) argued for the importance of Habermas’s discourse ethics within 
information systems research. The theory of communicative action (TCA) (Habermas, 1984, 
1987), which developed out of the earlier theory of knowledge-constitutive interests 
(Habermas, 1978), argues that the most fundamental characteristic of human beings as a 
species is our ability to jointly coordinate our actions through language and communication; 
and further that the ability to communicate is grounded on the capacity to understand each 
other. Thus the primary function of communication is the construction of understanding and 
then agreement about shared activities. Humans do, of course, engage in other activity: for 
example purposive instrumental action in solving a problem or reaching a goal; or strategic 
action where communication is used to achieve personal ends through some form of 
deception or control. But even in this latter case, understanding is a necessary prior condition. 
 
Habermas therefore sees communication oriented towards reaching agreement as the primary, 
and most common, form of communication, and proposes that the principal means of 
reaching agreement is through rational discussion and debate - the “force of the better 
argument” – as opposed to the application of power, or the dogmas of tradition or religion. 
Habermas elucidates the nature of a “rational” argument or discourse in terms of two 
concepts: i) that contentions or utterances rest on particular validity claims that may be 






Whenever we actually say something, make an utterance, we are at least implicitly making 
claims that may be contentious. These validity claims are of three types, and each one points 
to or refers to an aspect of the world, or rather analytically different worlds. These three are: 
 Truth: concerning facts or possible states of affairs about the material world 
 Rightness: concerning valid norms of behavior in our social world 
 Sincerity (truthfulness): concerning my personal world of feelings and intentions. 
This approach was originally developed in Habermas (1984, pp. 75-101) where he argues that 
relationships to these three worlds are inherent in the social scientist’s concept of action, and 
also in ordinary, everyday communicative action by speakers and hearers.  
 
Habermas comes to this conception by considering four distinctively different types of social 
action – teleological, normatively-regulated, dramaturgical and communicative. Teleological 
action is purposeful action designed to bring about a certain state of affairs in the objective or 
material world. It is the classical form of action underlying traditional economic theory based 
on a choice between alternative courses of action in order to realize some objective. This 
form of action presupposes the existence of an objective world of entities and states of affairs 
that exist or could be brought about through purposeful action.  
 
Normatively-regulated action, by contrast, concerns behavior that orients itself towards the 
agreed and valid norms and expectation within a social group. Thus particular behaviors are 
deemed to be acceptable or unacceptable within a particular context or set of circumstances. 
Norms have a binding force to the extent that actors agree that they are valid or, put the other 
way, when actors agree that they are valid they are thereby part of the social group. Thus the 
social world, for a particular social group, consists of a system of norms against which 
individual behavior can be judged to accord or deviate, and which in turn need to be justified 
as deserving to be seen to be legitimate. 
 
The third form of action Habermas calls dramaturgical action in which the subject relates to 
the subjective or personal world. This consists of the totality of subjective states of an 




are, actually presented to others. The most obvious theoretical perspective is Goffman’s  
(1969) “Presentation of Self in Everyday Life”. The key validity question here is to what 
extent do others judge that the presentation is in fact sincere – i.e., is a proper reflection of the 
subject’s actual subjective states? Here, there is a significant difference from the other two 
worlds in terms of the extent to which verification can take place. The objective world 
consists of material states of affairs that are the same for all and against which propositions 
can be tested for truth or falsity. The social world consists of norms against which actions can 
be tested in terms of their correspondence or violation. But in the subjective world, other 
actors have no access to the actual subjective states of the individual and so judgments of 
sincerity or truthfulness are perhaps harder than those of truth or rightness. 
 
3.2 Critical Realism 
As we saw in the introduction, human communication covers two potentially distinct 
domains – the social and conceptual on the one hand, and the physical on the other – and with 
Habermas we have brought in a third domain – the personal world, so it is important that 
these can be reconciled philosophically. For this reason, we begin by locating our work 
within the critical realist (CR) paradigm which accepts the ontological reality of a variety of 
different entities, be they physical, social, cognitive or abstract (Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, 
Lawson, & Norrie, 1998; Bhaskar, 1978, 1979, 1993). Such entities do not need to be 
measurable, or even directly observable, so long as we can postulate that they have causal 
effects. CR has been advocated as a philosophy for IS (de Vaujany, 2008; Dobson, 2001; 
Mingers, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; Mutch, 1999) and used in empirical research (Bygstad, 2010; 
Iannacci & Hatzaras, 2012; Longshore Smith, 2006; Volkoff, Strong, & Elmes, 2007; 
Wikgren, 2005; Wynn & Williams, 2008) so we will only highlight the aspects relevant for 
this framework.  
 
The first is the distinction between the transitive and the intransitive domains of science and 
knowledge. Science (and social science) is a human activity and therefore much of it is a 
social production – theories, experiments, papers, journals, debates etc. – are all human-
dependent, and therefore transitive. However, the objects of knowledge, that which 
knowledge is about, are external and independent of our knowledge of them – they are 




physical laws would operate even if humans did not exist, but also for the social world, even 
though social laws and mechanisms can only operate in and through people in general. Even 
speech can become intransitive once it has been uttered and become detached from the 
circumstances of its production. 
 
Second, there is a distinction between the real, the actual and the empirical. The real, that is, 
everything there is, consists of enduring structures and mechanisms that have particular 
tendencies and powers generating causal effects in the world. These structures, which may be 
unobservable and may not exercise their powers all the time, interact with each other and 
generate the actual events that do (and do not) occur. Some of these events are observed and 
experienced, and have the potential to become the empirical data of science. Both the actual 
and the empirical are part of the real and have causal effects of their own. CR also 
emphasizes the idea of generative causality in opposition to the Humean version of a constant 
conjunction of events. CR  is also comfortable with the view that reasons can be causes, that 
is, that the reasons an actor gives for their actions may be an adequate explanation, although 
we must always be aware of unknown or perhaps unacknowledged conditions of action. 
 
With regard to semiotics, critical realism has already recognized its importance although it is 
not that well developed. Bhaskar himself says that “the centerpiece of any adequate theory of 
meaning must be the semiotic triangle” (Bhaskar, 1993, p. 222-223), where his triangle 
consists of signifier, signified and referent. In this, it is clearly invoking Peirce rather than 
Saussure with its inclusion of the referent or object of the sign. In fact it can be seen as a 
simplified version of Peirce’s scheme (Nellhaus, 1998): the signified, or interpretant belongs 
in the transitive dimension while the referent or object is part of the intransitive dimension. In 
fact, Nellhaus argues that Bhaskar’s ontological domain of the empirical – those events that 
we actually observe and experience - should be re-conceptualized as the domain of semiosis. 
 
Important for our theoretical approach is CR’s insistence that semiosis cannot be reduced 
either to the play of signifiers, as with Saussure or Derrida, or to a purely hermeneutic sphere 
(Fairclough, Jessop, & Sayer, 2004). Semiosis must always have external referents, and 
extra-semiotic conditions and consequences:  “semiosis presupposes embodied, intentional, 




(Fairclough, et al., 2004, p. 28) not to mention the technology that both enables and 
conditions communication. We will call this “material semiotics” to use a term from Haraway 
(1988) and Law (1995).  
 
4. Integrating Peirceian Semiotics 
Having established the broader framework, we now need to delve into the actual processes of 
communication and signification that underlie these three worlds and their inter-relations. We 
will do this in three stages: first we will describe the processes of semiosis through the work, 
primarily, of Peirce. Second we will clarify the nature of information as it is represented, 
stored and transmitted semiologically, and show that the information carried by a message is 
not necessarily the same as the meaning of the message, or the meaning of the information 
for a receiver. Information is objective and true; meaning is subjective and potentially true or 
false. Finally, we will outline the process whereby humans process information and meaning, 
and come to act upon it, as one of embodied cognition. 
 
4.1 Peirceian Semiotics 
For Peirce(1931-1958)
3, a sign involves a triadic, as opposed to Saussure’s dyadic, relation 
between a representamen (signifier), an interpretant (signified) and an object– see Figure 1. 
A sign … {representamen} is something which stands to somebody for something in some 
respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an 
equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the 
interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, 
not in all respects but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground 
of the representamen. (Peirce, 1931-1958, 2.228, original emphasis) 
 
                                               
3References to Peirce are to volume and paragraph in the collected works published much later. Most of his 
writings were between 1880 and 1910. We should note that Peirce wrote extensively about semiosis over many 
years, often developing or changing his terminology, so there is not a single model or theory. Other sources are 




Peirce was primarily interested in the process of semiosis, that is, the way in which signs 
were continually interpreted and re-interpreted within the process of communication. 
Considering Figure 1 in more detail, the representamen is the physical manifestation of the 
sign – its form as opposed to its content (properly speaking “sign” should only refer to the 
whole combination of the three aspects but sometimes it is used to refer just to the 
representamen). The representamen brings with it two effects – the entity that it represents, 
and the idea that it generates in an interpreter. The interpretant is not the interpreter per se but 
does imply that there is some form of interpreter. The interpretant is seen by Peirce as another 
sign thus leading to the idea of continual semiosis. These two effects can be seen as the same 
as Frege’s (1952) distinction between sense and reference. The “meaning” of a sign thus 
consists in both its sense and reference. The entity is that which the sign stands in place of, 
and can be physical, mental, imaginary or another sign. 
 
Peirce developed these basic categories in several ways (Noth, 1990). He produced complex 
typologies of different types of representamen. The main one distinguished between icons, 








imitate their objects in some way, for example a picture, a model, or a simulation. Indexes 
relate to their objects directly, either causally or temporally. For example, a thermometer is 
an index of the temperature; the sun setting is an index of nighttime coming. Symbols have 
no direct relationship to their object at all; the association is purely conventional as in 
language or mathematical notation. Symbols have a relationship purely through the habit of 
their association. 
 
Peirce was very concerned with the way in which signs came to be interpreted in practice 
(Almeder, 1980). For the interpretant, he distinguished between the immediate interpretant 
and the dynamical interpretant
4. The immediate interpretant is the “quality of the impression 
                                               
4He also talked of a final interpretant but was somewhat unclear about what this meant. He also sometimes 
talked of the emotional/energetic/logical interpretants but there is debate about the relationship between the two 
schemes (Atkin, 2006) 
The sign 
Representamen 
icon, index, symbol 
Interpretant 
• Immediate interpretant – 
direct meaning of the sign 
• Dynamic interpretant – the 
effect of the meaning on an 
interpreter 
• Final interpretant – the 
eventual effect after unlimited 
semiosis 
Object 
• Immediate object 
as represented 
within the sign 
• Dynamic object as 
implied by or 
generating the sign 




that the sign is fit to produce and does not consist in any actual reaction” (8.315). It is thus the 
intrinsic meaning or interpretability of the sign before anyone has actually interpreted it. The 
dynamical interpretant is the “direct effect actually produced by a sign upon the interpreter of 
it” (CP 4.536). This is the idea or meaning that the sign generates in a particular person, 
related to the object represented by the sign. It is, therefore, in part dependent on the 
interpreter and may differ from one to another. It also generates some effect in the interpreter, 
whether a physical action, or a mental one such as another sign, which may in turn be 
expressed in a representamen. Thus we have the process of semiosis or signification. 
 
Peirce also distinguished two forms of the object of the sign, also called the immediate object 
and the dynamical (or mediate) object: 
“We have to distinguish the immediate object, which is the object as the sign itself represents 
it, and whose being is thus dependent upon the representation of it in the sign, from the 
dynamical object which is the reality which by some means contrives to determine the sign to 
its representation” (CP 4.536).  
This very important distinction commits Peirce to at least some form of realism, although not 
a naive realism. The immediate object is that which is contained within the sign, and picks 
out certain aspects or grounds of the “real” object – the dynamical one. The latter is the 
underlying, but not immediately present, trigger of the sign.  
 
To illustrate these concepts with an example, if someone asks “Where is the bathroom?” the 
immediate object is the concept of a bathroom as expressed in the sign. In this case it is just a 
bathroom in general, not a particular one. The dynamical object is the actual bathroom 
(assuming there is one), with all its particular characteristics, which exists outside the world 
of the sign. The immediate interpretant is the meaning of the question as a whole that any 
speaker would understand, and the dynamical interpretant is the effect the question has on an 
interpreter which may lead them to give directions or ask someone else.  
 
Semiotics was only a part of Peirce’s extensive philosophical thought. We should also note 
for later that he was one of the founders of American pragmatism (Buchler, 1940; Peirce, 
1878),(CP 5.411, 5.197, 5.597)] and thus his theory of meaning was built on his semiotics. 




on the world, which is precisely the dynamical and final interpretants of a sign or message. 
Less well known is that he was also a phenomenologist (Buchler, 1940), (CP 1.284-7, 1.536-
7), to some extent pre-dating Husserl (1973 (orig. 1913)), and developed a theory of three 
modes of being: firstness – pure quality or actuality in itself; secondness – relations between 
one thing or quality and another; and thirdness  - cognition, concepts and laws about firstness 
and secondness. The sign embodies all three modes.  
 
One area not developed by Peirce was the physical or technological aspects of semiotics and 
communication, which is manifestly of importance for this paper, and so we consider some 
later developments as we develop our framework (Figure 1 in section 4).  
Morris (1938) developed semiotics as the science of all signs to include non-linguistic and 
non-human sign processes. He characterized semiotics in terms of three dimensions: 
syntactics, semantics and pragmatic. Syntactics, or syntax, covers all the formal relations 
between signs, including the rules of language, or the sign system. Semantics is a polysemous 
term that is closely related to meaning. Initially, Morris saw it as specifically the relations 
between the sign and its object, i.e., reference or denotation, but later included the sense, or 
immediate interpretant, of the sign as well. Pragmatics covers “the origin, the uses and the 
effects of signs” (Morris, 1938, p. 30) which would include the biological, psychological and 
social aspects of the intentional use of signs and formed the basis of Habermas’s universal 




In another development relevant for this paper, Jakobson (1956) saw that Saussure’s 
distinction between the syntagmatic and paradigmatic axes was essentially based on the 
difference between metaphor and metonymy or, more basically, similarity and contiguity. A 
                                               
5
 Later work within information systems by Stamper (1997) extended Morris’s typology. Below the level of 
syntactics, Stamper added the material level of physical phenomena that allow the storage and transmission of 
signs, and the empiric level which concerns the effective and efficient transmission of messages as is dealt with 
by traditional information theory (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). He also added an upper level – the social- that 






metaphor is a figure of speech, or trope, in which one element (or signified) stands for 
another on the basis of some similarity or likeness (e.g., “the university of life”). Metaphor is 
incredibly common in language. Indeed, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue that the origin of 
almost all language is metaphorical in relation to our basic physical experience of the world. 
Metonymy is another trope in which one signified stands for another on the basis of a direct 
relation, e.g., part/whole, cause/effect or substance/form (e.g., “I spy the sails”, “The 
mercury’s through the roof”). In this, it is very similar to Peirce’s indexical type of sign. So a 
sign gains meaning through a combination of likeness and contiguity. 
 
Jakobson also developed a model that applied to any speech or communicative act (Jakobson, 
1960) comprising of six components or elements, each of which leads to a different function 
of language. These are: the addresser, the addressee, the context, the message, the code 
shared by addresser and addressee), and the physical or psychological contact to transmit the 
message. These influenced Habermas (1994) as underpinning for his theory of 
communicative action.  
 
4.2 Semiotics in Business and Information Technology 
Semiotics has been used in a range of business areas particularly, as might be expected, in 
marketing, for example: Mick (1986), Arnold et al (2001), Harvey (2001), and Lawes(2002). 
In other domains, Barley (1983) used semiotics as a way of studying the systems of meaning 
within particular occupations; Fiol(1989) analyzed CEO’s letters to shareholders to 
understand a company’s propensity to enter in to joint ventures; Brannen(2004) studied the 
cultural differences that can undermine an organization’s transfer of policies and process 
abroad ; and Cooper et al (2001) used semiology to decode the reviews of regulated utility 
companies produced in the UK. 
 
Moving to IS and IT, a considerable body of work has developed around Stamper’s (1991) 
extension of Morris’s (1938) framework, discussed in more detail below. This work generally 
goes under the name “organizational semiotics” (Gazendam, Jorna, & Cijsouw, 2003; Liu, 
Clarke, Andersen, & Stamper, 2001, 2002a, 2002b) but it mainly concerns information 




semiotics and ranges from studies of instrumentation and the human-computer interface 
(HCI) (May & Andersen, 2001) through the development of information systems having 
regard to both their technical and human aspects (Stamper, 2001) to studies of IS within their 
organizational context (Clarke, 2002). There are other sources used, for example, Robichaud 
(2002) employs Greimas’s (1983 (orig 1966)) narrative grammar to analyze a process of 
public consultation in a Canadian city, and Kryssanov et al (2003) use Luhmann’s(1986) 
autopoietic social theory in user interface design.  
 
Moving away from Stamper’s framework, there are several semiotic analyses of ICT as a 
communicational tool. For example, Warschauer and Grimes (2007) analyzed Web 2.0 type 
software such as blogs, wikis and social networking sites in terms of semiotic constructs such 
as authorship, audience, and artifact. Tredinnick (2007) also used post-structuralist semiotics 
(e.g., Barthes, Foucault, Derrida) to study the effects of hypertextuality in the WWW. 
Menchik and Tian (2008) used Peirce’s and Morris’s semiotic frameworks to analyze the 
ways in e-mail users overcome the exclusion of non-linguistic cues and gestures in e-mail 
interactions. Mancini and Buckingham Shum (2006) discuss a discourse representation 
system, based on semiotics, specifically for domains of debate and contestation such as 
academic discourse. Price and Shanks (2005) developed a framework based on Peircean 
semiotics to assess information quality involving both objective and subjective perspectives 
while Rosenkranz et al (2013) used semiotics in evaluating the quality of the language used 
within studies of requirements development.  
 
Semiotics leads to the nature of information itself being a key issue. First there is the 
relationship between information and meaning – is the information carried or contained in a 
message the same or different to its meaning? Second, there is the question of how 
information is embodied or represented symbolically in sign systems, and how it is 
transmitted. These are both core topics within semiotics. Mingers (1995a, 1996) proposed a 
theory of information, based on semiotics, that explicitly differentiated information from 
meaning. This leads us on to consider how information actually gets translated into meaning, 
and then how meaning and information are transmitted. Mingers argues that this occurs 
through a process of embodied cognition (Mingers, 2001) and this will be developed further 




semiotic perspective include Beynon-Davies(2009a, 2009b; 2010), Huang (2006), Brier 
(2001), (Baskerville, 2010), Raber (2003) and Price (2005). 
 
The final area we shall discuss is the human-computer interface (HCI) where signs and 
symbols obviously play a central role. Here, Anderson (1990) coined the term “computer 
semiotics” by which he meant adapting the semiotic theories that had primarily arisen in 
linguistics to the specific domain of computing. In particular, he drew on both the 
structuralist tradition of semiotics as represented by Barthes and Eco (Ramussen, 1986), and 
the phenomenological/speech acts approach as represented by Winograd and Flores (1987). 
However, for the purposes of this paper we wish to highlight a more recent trend that goes 
beyond structuralism or phenomenology to encompass the idea of embodiment. De Souza 
(2005) has developed a theory of semiotic engineering which sees HCI as enabling an active 
communication process between the system user and (implicitly) the system designer, and 
O’Neill (2008) has built on these ideas.  This strand of thought will form part of the theory 
developed below.. 
 
5. Information and Meaning 
From the perspective of information systems, we need to consider how signs and symbols get 
translated into action (embodied cognition) and how actions and information get transmitted 
(technology). As a first step we will consider the relation between meaning and information. 
Are they in fact the same, so that the meaning of a message is the same as the information it 
conveys? Or are they distinct, in which case how do they relate to each other?  
 
A semiotic theory of information can be developed (Mingers, 1995a, 1996, 2013) combining 
ideas from Dretske (1981), Habermas (1984), and Maturana (1980). Similar ideas have been 
proposed recently by Floridi (2005, 2011). Following Bateson (1973), the foundation of 
information (data and more generally signs) must be differences in the physical world, for 
without difference there is only uniformity. More particularly, differences that “make a 
difference”, that is, generate an event or a sign. Events carry information because the 
occurrence of an event reduces the possibilities of what might happen to what actually does 




or message) carries the information about what caused it, or led to it. That is, what must be 
the case in the world for the event to have occurred?  Such information exists independently 
of any observer, indeed, it might never actually be observed
6
. Nevertheless it carries with it 
the information concerning its own genesis. 
 
Information can also be transmitted provided that there are causal links between the sender 
and the receiver (not necessarily people). This occurs to the extent to which states of the 
sender are correlated or connected to states of the receiver. Independent events transmit no 
information; completely linked events transmit all information. Most situations are between 
the two extremes – the receiver can be affected by things other than the sender (noise), and 
not all of the information from the source will affect the receiver (equivocation). We note 
also that, following Bhaskar (1993), absences can be causes and therefore can generate 
information. So the gas bill that is not paid by the due date generates information to that 
effect for the company, which then triggers a reminder letter.  
 
Information is, then, clearly defined – semantic information7 is the propositional content of a 
sign, that is, what is implied about states of affairs in the world given that the sign exists. This 
definition has several consequences: 
 Information is an objective commodity – it is carried by events and signs whether or not it is 
observed or extracted, and information can be stored and transmitted by the environment, 
artefacts and people. 
 Information is distinct from its embodiment in a sign or message since the information itself can 
have causal events – a knock on the door leads us to open it not because of the physical knock, 
but because it carries the information that someone is there. 
 The amount of information that is available to a particular receiver depends on their prior state 
(often knowledge) relative to the sign. A book in Chinese has no available information for 
someone who does not read Chinese. Signs about a car not starting will have much more 
information available for a mechanic than someone who is only a driver. This does not contradict 
                                               
6 In Bhaskar’s terms, differences and information exist in the domain of the actual, but if they are observed they 
become empirical.  




the idea that information is objective – if someone does not know the combination to a safe the 
money inside is not available to them but still exists. 
 Information must be true. We may misunderstand or misinterpret a sign but the sign itself only 
carries true information.  
This theoretical conception allows us to specify clearly terms which are often contested 
within information systems: 
 Data is a collection of signs, usually brought together for some purpose, to store or transmit 
information. They are usually numeric, pictorial, linguistic or gestural. 
 Semantic information is the propositional content of data, typically in the form of a message 
but also in the form of a naturally occurring sign. 
 Meaning has two different usages. First there is the system of meanings that are publically 
available within a sign system such as language (Peirce’s immediate interpretant). These can 
be drawn on by competent language users in their communications (Habermas, 1979a). It is 
that which allows an utterance to carry information but it is not identical to that information. 
The second usage is the “meaning” that the recipient gains from an utterance (Peirce’s 
dynamic interpretant) and/or that which the sender intends. If the meaning that the sign has, 
its connotation, is in fact true – i.e., the state of affairs that is described or implied - does in 
fact exist, then connotation is also information. If it is not true, the sign may be meaningful 
but it will not carry information. 
This draws a clear distinction between information and meaning. Information is objective, in 
the sense of being independent of the sender or receiver, and must be true to be information. 
Meaning is intersubjective, in being at least partly dependent on human interpreters, and is 
generated from information. Thus, information systems, which store, process and transmit 
information, are only a part of wider systems of meaningful human communication. 
 
 
5.1 Illustrative example: Khipu, information and meaning  
Beynon-Davies (2010) has usefully refocused our attention on a narrower, and neglected, 




 century Inka 
culture, thus defamiliarising our notions within a different era and set of technologies. The 
Inka ‘bureaucracy’ sent and received many messages daily in support of the activity of the 
empire. Typically, such messages contained details of resources such as items in store houses, 




workforces. Messages had to be clear, compact and portable. For this purpose the khipu was 
used, consisting of an assemblage of colored, knotted cotton or camelid (llama or alpaca 
wool) cords. The use of weaving and textiles for both tool-making and communication have 
deep roots in Andean culture. The khipucamayuq (keeper of the khipus) were responsible for 
encoding and decoding the messages. Encoding or ‘writing’ a khipu involved tying together a 
complex network of cords of different materials and colors, and adding to them a series of 
different forms of knot. Decoding or ‘reading’ a khipu involved a khipucamayuq, both in 
visual inspection and running his fingers rapidly over the knots. It would seem that khipu 
were used by the Inka as a three-dimensional sign-system in which data were recorded by 
tracing figures in space with pieces of cord. In this way information was relayed and meaning 
gained through reference to the pre-set symbolic meaning system. 
 
Beynon-Davies (2010) utilizes the semiotics ladder of Stamper (2001) in terms of the 
physical/ empiric, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic (social) layers. At the level of empirics 
(data system), khipu can be considered purely as physical artefacts. First, the maker of khipu 
would consider the construction of cords. Then he would consider the placement of cords 
upon other cords. This would be followed by choices concerning the construction and 
coloring of knots – a palette of some 60 colors - as well as the placement of knots upon cords.  
At the level of syntactics (information system), physical elements of khipu can be considered 
as symbols and specified in terms of some data model. There is evidence for the knot as being 
the fundamental symbolic element within khipu. The construction and positioning of knots 
relative to each other upon a pendant cord can be seen to constitute a datum. A related 
collection of knots upon a cord – a knot group – constituted a data item. The collection of 
knots within a knot group serves to value the data item. A group of pendant cords would 
constitute a data element and the entire assemblage of cords within a khipu constituted a data 
structure.  
At the level of semantics (information system), Beynon-Davies suggests that knot groups tied 
on pendant cords within certain khipu represent numbers to the base 10 (decimal). Particular 
knot types such as single, figure of eight and long knots and their positioning upon pendant 
cords signify distinct numbers. The closer the knot to the top of a cord: the higher the 




then 10. Knots tied to pendant, subsidiary or tertiary cords could be used to signify numerals 
or magnitudes of things. However, numbers could be used as ‘labels’ denoting other 
referents, such that a given knot group on a khipu can be considered as similar in nature to a 
modern bar code, with individual knots substituting for the bars of the code. 
 
In terms of pragmatics (the activity system), khipu need to be understood as part of the 
information systems within which they were used and the activity systems they supported. 
Khipu only makes sense in the context of the information specialists of the khipucamayuq; 
the chaski - highly trained runner/messengers as part of the Inka transport network; the 
tributary systems of the Inka and their need to manage the distribution of labor throughout the 
empire. Therefore, a number of activity systems of the Inka Empire such as tax collection, the 
administration of workforces in the building of collective works and the distribution of goods 
within the Empire relied on an effective system of communication. There is clear evidence of 
the use of khipu for the keeping of records within wider communication systems, for example 
accounting, provincial census and personal status records, with data flowing throughout the 
administrative hierarchy.  
 
Beynon-Davies’ case usefully illustrates what he calls ‘the enactment of significance’, while 
supporting our view that it is necessary to distinguish between the (intersubjective) system of 
signification and representation that allows messages to be transmitted; the (objective, i.e., 
true) information that messages can transmit; and the (subjective) meanings that generated by 
the information and its representation. The case also provides some critique of any strong 
sociomateriality, ‘entanglement’ perspective by disaggregating the units for analysis, and by 
arguing that the term information system is overloaded, with the focus too often on the IT 
artifact and organization, thus downplaying the role of the information system, and how 
significance is enacted through processes of semiosis.  
  





We now move to the process by which messages come to be interpreted, reacted to and acted 
on to generate technologically-based communicative interaction. In contrast to the traditional 
cognitivist, representationalist paradigm, we shall adopt the perspective of cognition as an 
active, embodied phenomenon (Mingers, 2001). This draws on the phenomenology of 
Heidegger (1962) and Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1963), autopoiesis (Maturana & Varela, 1980; 
Mingers, 1995b; Varela, 1991), and work within ICT such as Winograd and Flores (1987), 
Dourish (2001), O’Neill (2008), Schultze (2010) and Schultze and Orlikowski (2010).   
 
The essence of this position is to deny the Cartesian split between mind and body so 
fundamental in disciplines such as artificial intelligence, computing, information and 
cognitivist psychology, in favor of one that recognizes the essentially embodied nature of 
human cognition whether at the level of perception, thought, behavior or language. This is 
also the position underscored by the work of Johnson (1987) and Lakoff and Johnson (1980), 
including their emphasis on reason shaped by the body, a cognitive unconscious to which we 
have no direct access, and  metaphorical thought of which we are largely unaware. 
 
As autopoietic living systems we have a nervous system that is organizationally-closed and 
self-referring, but which is interactively open to the environment. The type and limitations of 
these interactions are shaped primarily by our own nervous system rather than by the 
environment (structure-determined). External events, e.g., messages with information, trigger 
responses but the nature of the response is determined by the readinesses of the nervous 
system at the time – indeed the system determines what can be triggers for it. The 
transformation of information into meaning (digitalizing the analogue) is carried out largely 
unconsciously by the body presenting our conscious mind with pre-structured meanings
8
. 
This is the process of embodied cognition. 
“There is not thought and language … Expressive operations take place between thinking 
language and speaking thought; … It is not because they are parallel that we speak; it is 
because we speak that they are parallel … I do not speak of my thoughts; I speak them and 
what is between them.”(Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 18, orig. emphasis) 
                                               
8Much of this was recognized by Peirce who saw that semiosis worked on the basis of “habits”, both mental and 




This is not to say that the meaning triggered by signs and symbols is completely arbitrary or 
subject-dependent. The very fact that they can trigger anything in the nervous system reflects 
the way in which we are socialized to the wider social system within which connotative 
systems exist. We, as human beings, are “structurally coupled” with our immediate 
environment of people, signification systems and materials. We can say that signs act as 
affordances and constraints – they tend or afford to lead to particular interpretations and 
constrain against others – but this is always relative to the knowledge and intentions of the 
receiver. 
 
On one view, the interpretation of signs can be seen in terms of three stages, illustrated with 
an example (from Peirce) in  Figure2 (Mingers, 1995a). 
 
 
“What sort of day is it?” 
Meaning 1: Understanding, 
Immediate interpretant 
Meaning 2: Connotation, 
Dynamical interpretant 
Meaning 3: Intention, 
Final interpretant 
Meaning 2: Generation,  
Dynamical object 
Meaning 1: Action,  
Immediate object 
“It is rather stormy” 
Immediate 
object: wanting 
to know how 
the weather is 
Dynamical object: 
the addressee has 










Suppose the addresser sees the addressee look out of the window at the weather and asks 
what it is like. In Peirce’s terms, the immediate object is wanting to know the current 
weather, the dynamical object is the fact that the addressee has looked at it. The first stage of 
interpretation (understanding or immediate interpretant) is simply appreciating the general 
meaning of the message, what any competent speaker of the language would be able to do. 
This will be done sub-consciously by the body and nervous system (what Heidegger would 
term “ready-at-hand”) unless there is some degree of ambiguity in which case the message 
may become more an object of conscious reflection (“present-at-hand”). 
 
The second stage (connotation or dynamical interpretant) brings in the individual knowledge 
and motivations of the addressee. It is the effect of the message or sign on that person; it is 
the process by which the semantic information carried by the message is transformed into 
meaning. This stage is not purely individual but socially structured in terms of the 
addressee’s forms of life (Wittgenstein, 1958). Finally, the third stage (intention or final 
interpretant) leads to some form of action or result which could be a reply, or an activity, or 
just a decision not to respond. In any event, the addressee’s state of readiness will be changed 
in some small way. Where some physical action such as a reply is involved, there will be a 
similar set of stages involved in the production of a response. The whole of this process is 
one of embodied cognition in that much of it happens beneath the level of consciousness, 
carried out through the structure of the body and nervous system. 
 
It is at this point that we can bring in technology, or perhaps in this context it is better to call 
it media – “the material of the world that affords the mediation of some form of content” 
(O'Neill, 2008, p. 138). Or, as Dourish (2001), who is concerned with tangible and social 
computing, has said: 
 “Tangible and social computing both capitalize upon our familiarity with the everyday world, 
a world of social and physical interactions. As physical beings, we are unavoidably enmeshed 
in a world of physical facts. … So, the social and the physical are inescapable aspects of our 
everyday experiences.” (p. 100). 
 




As established earlier, semiotics has been widely applied already in the study of ICTs and 
business though this has not always been through utilizing Peirceian semiotics. Particularly 
interesting, in the light of our emerging framework, is the work of Dourish (2001) and 
O’Neill (2008) who look at human computer interaction by drawing on phenomenology 
(Heidegger, 1962), Merleau-Ponty’s (1964) work on embodiment, and semiotics to develop 
the notion of  embodied interaction. They are particularly interested in how interactive media 
can be studied and designed, taking into account the physical and social worlds in which they 
operate, and how media and technologies relate to the human beings interacting with them. 
Our framing plays directly into such work.  As one example, O’Neill (2008), who at one 
point talks of  the ‘semiotic screen’,  refers to the Brazil-based SERG group that draws 
heavily on Peirce’s conception of a sign to develop their  understanding  of signification  with 
interactive media in screen-based interfaces. Here they find particularly useful Peirce’s 
concept of how signification takes place through “thirdness”, where a representation is 
related to its object via an interpretant (Prates, de Souza, & Barbosa, 2000). If this example 
seems to focus on the cognitive semiotic dimension of the Figure 3 framework, then these 
HCI researchers are also focusing on the embodied interaction of the personal and material, 
in a physical, human designed space. Dourish in particular also stresses the role of the social 
in HCI assessment and design processes, giving as an example  the study of an air traffic 
control center by Hughes et al (1995). 
 
6.2 Illustrative example: virtual worlds and meaning  
We can pursue this further in the work of Schultze (2010) on embodiment and presence in 
virtual worlds. These are multi-modal platforms featuring rich graphics, 3D  rendering, high-
fidelity audio and video, motion and interactivity. Examples include Second Life, Teleplace, 
EverQuest, consisting of technology designed to create and experience virtual spaces, objects 
and people with which a user can interact.  Schultze reveals a complex world where avatars 
re-embody the communicator who has been disembodied through computer mediation. 
Embodiment here means that the communicator can engage in practices of the body (e.g., 
smile, sit, move) and have a sense of presence whether in an actual or virtual environment. 
Semiosis pervades both the design process and features of the virtual world, but also how it is 
operationalized through social, personal and material interaction. As Schultze describes it, 
how the users constructs an avatar with regard to personality, appearance and behavior is 




both the actual and the virtual world. Indeed Nowak and Rauh (2005) highlight some of the 
social norms of avatar appearance, with a humanoid gendered avatar being the first choice of 
self-representation, having the more likeable and persuasive qualities necessary to be 
effective in social settings. Here we can see the personal and social worlds interacting 
through sociation and semiosis, (which we develop below – see Figure 3) mediated by 
technology. One of the avatar’s key affordances is embodiment, in the sense of giving 
participants a virtual body that enables them to engage in practices of the body and recapture 
the body’s non-discursive, semiotic capabilities. Here we see the personal and the material 
interacting through embodiment and semiosis. This interaction is also performed to give 
experiences of presence. Schultze (2010) helpfully list six kinds of illusory presence – 
telepresence, social presence, co-presence, self-presence, hyper presence, and eternal 
presence – made possible through personal-material interactions. And, as we saw with Project 
Wonderland, virtual worlds can also be social worlds where sociomaterial and semiotic 
interactions link the social, the material, and emergent  meanings and performance. 
 
7. A Summary Integrative Framework - Semiosis and Three 
Worlds 
We have now reached the point at which we can assemble and introduce the integrative 
semiotic framework (see Figure 3) that draws on all the material developed above. In Figure 
3, semiotics is shown at the center of a triangle formed by Habermas’s (1987) three worlds: 
the personal, the social and the material worlds. But this framework goes beyond Habermas 
to consider both the relationships between the three worlds and the mediating role of 







Let us consider first the interior of the triangle. Semiosis relates to the personal world, the 
world of the subject, in the ways outlined above through the generation and interpretation of 
signs and messages. As human beings we exist in a world of meaning and communication 
and that is always a process of semiosis. Events and symbols have meaning for us (import) 
because of what they represent or stand for and our communicative intentions (conscious and 
unconscious) can only become operative when represented in some form of sign system. We 
would want to stress again that meaning is to be distinguished from information. Information 
is that content of a meaningful message that is, in fact, true whether or not it corresponds with 
the meaning that the recipient actually derives from the message. 
 
Semiosis also relates to the material world in that all signs have to have some form of 
physical embodiment in order to be signs, and they must also be transmitted through some 
form of physical media. By media we do not mean necessarily technology, although that is 



















Finally, semiotics relates to the social world in that the connotive aspects of sign systems are 
social rather than individual – they exist before and beyond the individual’s use of 
signs.Some semiotic interactions may be non-social, for instance taking hoof marks as a sign 
that a horse has passed by (an indexical sign), but the vast majority are symbolic and so rely 
on pre-existing agreements about the meanings of particular signs.  
 
Looking next at the outside, each side represents an ongoing form of relationship between the 
corners. Between the personal and social worlds there is a relationship of what we might call 
sociation. This is essentially the relationship between structure and action that has been so 
heavily discussed and debated. From a critical realist position, the work by Bhaskar (1979) 
and Archer (1988, 1995; Mutch, 2010) on morphogenesis addresses this area. The social and 
the individual are conceptualized as two real, independent but mutually interlocking systems. 
Society is an “ensemble” of structures, practices and conventions realized in the form of 
“position-practices” – role positions and social practices. It thus pre-exists the individuals 
who occupy these positions and conditions that activities they undertake. But, at the same 
time, society is reproduced or transformed by that individual activity. Whilst emphasizing the 
ontological reality of social structures, Bhaskar accepts that they only exist through the 
activities they govern. An alternative conceptualization would be through Giddens’ (1984) 
structuration theory which is already well known within IS (Jones, 2008). 
 
Between the personal and the material worlds we have a relation of embodiment. This occurs 
in two ways – the first is embodied cognition which is to do with the physical human body 
and the manner in which this inextricably links thought and action, as has been outlined 
above. The second concerns technology, taken very broadly, and the ways in which it both 
enables and constrains human action (Dourish, 2001; O'Neill, 2008).  
 
Finally, between the social and the physical we have a relationship of socio/materiality as 
envisaged by, for example Orlikowski (2000, 2007), and (Leonardi & Barley, 2008; 2000, 
2007; 2008). As we recognized in the introduction, there are in fact several different ways of 
conceptualizing the relationship between the material (i.e., technology) and the social:  as one 
in which one side dominates the other; as one in which there is a mutual interaction between 




inseparable (which is currently called sociomateriality). Our position, from a critical realist 
perspective, would be the second one – i.e., independent but mutually interacting and shaping 
systems – rather than sociomateriality proper.  
 
In fact, what we can see from this diagram is that the outside relationships - sociation, 
embodiment and sociomateriality - are in fact all mediated through the process of semiosis. 
Since, phenomenologically, humans always already exist within a space constituted through 
meaning, and semiosis is the process of production and interpretation of meaning, it is not 
possible to conceptualize these forms of interaction without involving semiotics. 
  
 
8. Applying the Integrative Semiotic Framework: Two Cases 
 
The relevance of the framework is not restricted to HCI studies. Recall our position that 
signification processes must be located in relation to the personal world of minds, intentions 
and knowledge; the social world of power and normative practices; and the material world of 
space-time, technology and bodies (Habermas, 1984). Here we illustrate the potential of the 
framework using two extant case examples. 
 
8.1. TripAdvisor 
Our first example is Scott and Orlikowski’s (2009) analysis of the social media TripAdvisor. 
TripAdvisor, they record, is one of the largest online travel communities with over 20 million 
reviews and opinions stored on over one million hotels, restaurants and venues, contributed 
by some 30 million visitors per month. Scott and Orlikowski plot the transformation of how 
assessment knowledge of the industry is produced by studying two hotels. They find that 
TripAdvisor ranks them using the same algorithm, thus configuring them as rivals, though the 
hotels have different attributes, characteristics and, indeed, markets. There are also noticeable 
differences between the profiles of travelers posting their reviews of these two 
establishments. Postings can also be multi-media including images, e.g. photographs of 




personalized and  situated experiences in a hotel, and their decision to provide a review. 
Unlike the more traditional Automobile Association (AA) ratings that focus on operational 
issues and standardized assessments of facilities, TripAdvisor’s ratings  are “temporally 
sensitive continually reconfigured, personal, and  based upon relatively unregulated content” 
(Scott & Orlikowski, 2009). Not surprisingly hoteliers found the views and ratings often 
variable and subjective, but also felt unable to do much to change the type of knowledge 
being produced through this form of social media. Thus TripAdvisor, as a social media 
technology, gives the subjective reviews and ratings a determinacy and reach not otherwise 
achievable while also challenging the hoteliers’ and institutionalized hotel recognition 
schemes like AA’s primacy and control.  
 
This exploratory study brings out several points that lie within the sociomaterial dimension of 
the Figure 3 integrative framework. But highly pertinent questions can be asked from the 
other two dimensions – the personal/technological and the personal/social. How do 
individuals themselves relate to the technology – in what circumstances do they use it? Why 
do they use it? Is it only very good or bad experiences that get recorded? What is their level 
of belief on the accuracy and reliability of the data provided? Is it the ease of access that 
determines use, i.e. convenience, rather than confidence in the information? Is the description 
of “actual” experiences more convincing than statistical data? What is the role of semiosis in 
seeking answers to these questions? Then there is the personal/social dimension i.e. sociation 
and semiosis -  and how the personal influences the social ‘facts’ being created, and how 
these are then influencing personal decisions. Semiotically, how does social media like 
TripAdvisor change meaning, the flow of information, and create ratings and assessment as 
social ‘facts’? These sorts of questions raise issues about the creation, interpretation and 
response to signs, and the role of signs in creating a continually remade and contested social 
and personal reality. 
 
8.2 Dairy production plant 
 
The second example – the study of a fully computerized dairy production plant by Kallinikos 
(2011) -  is particularly alive to the role of signification in seeking to understand how ICTs 




as ICTs proliferate, they bring with them symbol schemes and codes that do not rely on the 
signifying conventions of similarity and proximity (Peirce’s indexical signification). This can 
create real difficulties in sense-making, and explains to a degree the attempts in our previous 
examples to technologically create similarity and proximity for social and personal use e.g. in 
the Project Wonderland and avatar examples. Kallinikos points to computer technology 
bringing to organizations, on a massive scale, comprehensive systems of information tokens 
and codes that sustain software packages, and also generating an immense output of data and 
information tokens.  
 
His study focuses on the milk refinement process at the heart of dairy production. Seven 
treatment lines produce over 50 products. Production is steered from a separate room that 
forms the production control center of the plant. Planning, controlling and monitoring are 
highly computerized, with process operators following the status and progression of 
production on  panels of bulbs and monitors in the control center. Several printouts also 
report incidents in the production process. The software package provides the means for 
controlling the quantity of received milk, channeling it into milk silos where it is preserved at 
the appropriate temperature before being refined.. The complex process of production is 
steered with the aid of three computers with human intervention at points to make commands 
and check progress.  
 
 Compared to other semi-automated production plants, high computerization changed the 
nature of work and personal-social-technological interactions. For example, in order to grasp 
how the software package worked and what it signified, it was necessary to reconstruct 
mentally the physical processes and flows regulated by the package. The cognitive burden 
and reliance on not easy-to-understand symbols and text were greatly increased through use 
of the software, computers and related displays, while physical presence in the production 
process, and information there from, were greatly decreased, not least due to the operators’ 
location in the remote control room. We see here fundamental changes in the way the 
personal, social and material interact through sociation, embodiment, sociomateriality and 
semiosis. Signification becomes increasingly abstract and representational. Thus sixteen 
panels with 700 color coded bulbs report the progression and status of the process.  A process 




system printout, often requiring specialized staff for its interpretation, records disturbances to 
the adequacy of the  conceptual and organizational logic of the software package itself, and 
brings another  series of codes, categories and definitions. In fact the documentation of the 
software package and the installations to which it relates involves 50 manuals of symbols 
definitions, codes and relationships and functions. Lack of physical experience with the 
installations, and lack of knowledge of the tangible reality of the plant were seen as severe 
limitations on operator capability, while at the same time the increased reliance on abstract 
coding systems increased their stress and anxiety. 
 
Kallinikos records that some moves towards improving referential attribution were made in 
the sign systems utilized. For example, the bulb system was geometrically organized to 
recapture the totality of the production process, through the decomposition and elaborate 
segmentation of its various steps. A sort of structural resemblance was thus established 
between the bulbs (symbol tokens) and the absent reality of the refinement process 
(reference). The geometric arrangement of the signaling system also contained an indication 
of temporal patterns. In a relatively simple, and precise way, the process printouts came to 
complement the bulbs system by indicating through numerical description the installation 
item concerned and through binary coding (right-wrong, stop-go) its current state. However, 
operators seemed to suggest that the vicarious representations of the software “failed to 
restore the  confidence that  referential reality is capable of providing  to people accustomed 
to context-embedded work based  not just on the reasoning and distancing capacity of the 
eye, but on sensory-motor manipulation  of tangible things” (Kallinikos, 2011, p. 116). His 
study is particularly rich in showing the central role semiosis needs to play in the study of 
ICTs in work organizations. ICTs interacting with people and organization in this case, saw 
process operators seemingly needing to turn their back on the physical production process 
and devote themselves instead to the task of examining the very structure of signs, codes and 
symbol schemes, whereby physical relationships were mediated and regulated. The 
codifications of the software package did not represent a mirror image of the material and 
technological constitution of the work processes, but produced a multi-layered fragmented 
systems of signs and codes that saw little relationship between token and referent, but 
influenced and was influenced by interaction through sociation, sociomateriality and 






9. Discussion  
We have used case research in HCI, virtual worlds, social media and computerized 
production plants to illustrate the applicability of the integrative semiotics framework arrived 
at in this paper. This, of course, does not exhaust the possibilities for the framework, 
especially in an IS field replete with technologies of information and communication highly 
dependent on codes and signification processes.  Our own view of the three worlds 
framework in Figure 3 is that there are different degrees of relationship between them in 
different contexts. Thus social networking/communication would seem to be heavily 
technologically dependent, with each new technological generation bringing forth new 
possibilities, while religion, for example, is heavily based on social practices and symbolism, 
and little on technology. The three systems interact generating emergent and enactive 
phenomena within any particular context, and, following our critical realist underpinning, 
these emergent phenomena can themselves affect the underlying systems in a process of 
downward causation. 
 
Our summary integrative framework and illustrative examples place us in a position to assess, 
and differentiate our position from, several strands of sociomateriality.  We would first 
critique Orlikowski’s later work, where the relationship between the social and the material 
(primarily technology) is quite radical. We neither have one dominating the other; nor two 
independent but interacting domains; but rather the two are so inextricably interrelated that 
they cannot be separated, and their properties are defined only in relation to each other. 
“In other words, entities (whether humans or technologies) have no inherent properties, but 
acquire form, attributes, and capabilities through their interpenetration. This is a relational 
ontology that presumes the social and the material are inherently inseparable.” (W.  
Orlikowski & Scott, 2008, p. 455). 
Interestingly, this quote would actually seem to be inherently self-contradictory since if we 
take it to be true then it would not be possible to parenthesize “humans or technologies” since 
the two would be indistinguishable. In terms of the framework articulated in this paper, we 
would argue that sociomateriality as described in Orlikowski and Scott (2008) actually 





Firstly, it reduces what should properly be two distinct but interacting structures to a duality 
that loses sight of both of its components. One reason for this reduction is the lack of what 
Elder-Vass (2008a) calls a depth ontology, and this would seem to be  an inherited influence 
from Giddens’ structuration theory9, but also from actor network theory(ANT) (Elder-Vass, 
2008b). The distinctions between the empirical, the actual, and the real provide a dimension 
of depth to critical realism’s ontology.  Bhaskar’s ontology, as we use it, has a second 
dimension of depth in its recognition that reality is stratified into an ontological hierarchy of 
entities, in which higher level entities have emergent properties – properties not possessed by 
the lower level entities that are their parts. These mechanisms in the domain of the real are 
responsible for emergent properties, synonymous with causal powers, that interact to produce 
actual events. For critical realists both social structures and human individuals are entities 
with emergent properties that arise from their ontological structure. Thus a critical realist 
account of the social, material and personal can recognize that human individuals, social 
structures and indeed entities of other kinds have causal powers that are distinct from each 
other, and that both (or all) interact to determine events -  for example social events though 
human individuals are parts of the social structure concerned. By contrast, Orlikowski and 
Scott (2008) subscribe to a relational ontology that presumes the social and the material are 
inherently inseparable, an ontological fusion signaled by the lack of a hyphen in 
‘sociomaterial’. They also see ANT, sympathetically, as the most prominent part of the 
sociomateriality literature. But as Elder-Vass (Elder-Vass, 2008b) points out, ANT’s 
ontology has a multi-dimensional absence of depth ontology and tends to be limited to the 
empirical. Its ontological flatness, and its assumption of symmetry between human and non-
human actors, mean that it cannot subscribe to critical realism’s assumption that particular 
causal powers (and hence the particular terminology appropriate to their description) vary 
depending on the underlying structure and mechanisms of each type of actor, be it material, 
social or personal. 
 
Secondly, it reduces the role of active subjects without whom neither society nor technology 
would actually exist or be reproduced; semiosis itself only operates through individual 
                                               
9
 Writing from a critical realist perspective on integrating institutional, relational, embodied and emergent 
attributes of structure, Elder-Vass (2008a) rejects structuration theory’s conflationist ontology while seeing 





subjects who must always be the ultimate efficient cause of any interaction. As critical 
realism argues, social structures (and technological structures to the extent that they are part 
of a social system as characterized in socio-technical systems and actor network theories) do 
not exist independently of the activities and practices that they regulate, and only exist in 
their effects or occurrences. Moreover, social structures do not exist independently of 
peoples’ understanding of what they are doing. Thus the social and the material cannot have a 
direct interaction, or indeed entanglement, without the mediation of people and semiosis. In 
the way sociomateriality is portrayed and operationalized in, for example, Orlikowski (2010) 
and Scott and Orlikowski (2009) people and semiosis  are operational but, we would argue, 
insufficiently theoretically  accounted for.   
 
Thirdly, it reduces the role of semiosis as the process and mechanism through which 
meaningful human activity occurs. Social relationships and structures are all embedded and 
represented in a semiotic fashion and physical media both represent and transmit signs and 
symbols but also only become objects of representation and interaction to the extent that they 
are or can be represented symbolically. In other words, technology/media are both a medium 
of semiosis, but also both a condition for and result of semiosis. 
 
Interestingly, the position represented in Figure 3 is in fact quite compatible with Orlikowski 
(2000) which puts forward the idea of a technology-in-practice view, though we have of 
course provided the addition of semiotics. We also preserve the idea inherent in a critical 
realist position but not in that of Orlikowski (2000) that, notwithstanding the second point 
above,  social structure is ontologically separate from the activities of individual people. It 
both pre-dates any particular individual, and can in time be reproduced or transformed by 
their activities (Archer, 1995, 2000).  
 
10. Conclusion  
In this paper we establish that semiosis, and thus semiotics, is at the heart of the 
representation and transmission of information and meaning, and thus central to processes of 
communication and information systems. By establishing philosophical foundations in a 




of information, meaning and embodiment to construct a consistent, integrative framework of 
operationalizable concepts for studying information systems and the personal, social and 
material worlds they inhabit. Recent advances in ICTs and their effects, as highlighted in our 
illustrative case studies on avatars, social media and synthetic/virtual worlds, bring a new 
urgency into information systems studies to develop a philosophical foundation and 
conceptual and analytical tools for researching the full meaning of material and non-material 
objects and their interaction. In this we are merely pointing to the escalation of what Zuboff 
(1988) alluded to some time ago in her claim that ICTs were altering the tangible, social and 
personal  nature of work and experience, transforming them, literally to reading, that is, “an 
encounter with symbol schemes and data items that are supposed to represent surrogate 
versions of physical and social items and relationships” (Kallinikos, 2011, p. 92). 
 
In conditions of accelerating virtualization, abstractness and representation driven by 
advances in technologies, media and software, this paper has aimed to provide a more 
philosophically grounded, more comprehensive theoretical framework for use in carrying out 
IS research. The framework throws light on recent conceptualizations of the relationship 
between the social and the technological such as sociomateriality, not least the notion that 
sociomateriality is always being enacted, performed and in the making. But on our view, two 
other relationships - of sociation and embodiment - also need to be addressed on a more 
precise basis, and semiosis needs to play a central, explicit rather than implied, part in the 
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